We evaluate the effect on test scores of a UK education reform which has increased funding of schools and encouraged their specialisation in particular subject areas, enhancing pupil choice and competition between schools. Using several data sets we apply matching methods to confront issues of the choice of an appropriate control group and selection bias. We demonstrate a statistically significant causal effect of the specialist schools policy on test score outcomes and test score gain. The effect peaks after 4 years, at which point the additional funding ceases. A specialisation effect occurs yielding large improvements in test scores in particular subjects.
Introduction
In many countries around the world, such as the US and the UK, there has been widespread debate about the best way to improve the educational performance of school pupils. A common theme in terms of policy is a shift away from centralised funding and provision to a decentralised approach to educational provision (Hoxby, 1996) . In the US, the reform of secondary schools is hotly debated since the new government is considering spending an extra $10 billion on education. This is because the federal programme, known as the 'No Child Left Behind Act'policy 1 , introduced by the previous US administration, is perceived to have had no effect on the educational performance of pupils, and may have actually harmed America's schools (The Economist, 2009). The new US administration has many ideas on how to spend the additional funds in an attempt to turn around failing schools, but the detail of this policy is yet to be seen.
In the UK a number of educational policy reforms have been introduced, such as the 1988 Education Reform Act, which led to the creation of a quasi market in education, at the heart of which is enhanced parental choice and competition between schools for pupils. In addition, funding for secondary schools has increased substantially since 1997, rising from £9.9b to £15.8b in 2006/7. Over the same period real expenditure per pupil increased by over 50%, from £3206 to £4836 (in 2005/6 prices). One of the key policy initiatives that has led in part to this increase in funding is the specialist schools policy, which was introduced in 1994. In fact, this policy not only increased funding to schools, it also simultaneously enhanced parental choice of school and competition between schools because schools were encouraged to specialise in particular subjects.
2 A primary objective of the policy was to improve the test score performance of pupils, and it is possible that there are lessons from the UK experience with this policy for the US administration.
Specialist schools are state-maintained secondary schools, typically for pupils aged 11-16, with a designated subject specialism, such as business studies, languages, science or technology. To obtain specialist status, a school is required to raise money from private sponsors (around £50,000 in 2001) and to have a development plan. Selected schools then receive a capital grant of £100,000 from central government, and around £130 per pupil over a four year period. This amounts to an approximate increase in funding per pupil of 5%. It is also worth noting that specialist schools were encouraged to spread good practice to non-specialist schools with respect, for instance, to teaching methods. Over 80% of secondary schools are now specialist, and the intention is that all schools will eventually become specialist.
There are very few studies which focus on the evaluation of the specialist school policy, and the evidence from this literature is mixed. Gorard (2002) , Jesson and Crossley (2004) and OFSTED (2005) find a positive effect on test scores. Schagen and Goldstein (2002) raise some issues regarding the methodological approach of this work, which uses school-level data, arguing that pupil level data and multi-level modelling techniques should be used. Taylor (2007) finds that the specialist schools policy has had very little impact on average test scores, though there is evidence of more substantial impacts for specific areas of specialisation, for example, business and technology. Bradley and Taylor (2008) estimate the impact of both Excellence in Cities and specialist schools policies using school-level panel data, and find a small positive effect of specialist schools on test scores. However, many of these papers fail to allow for the biases that may arise due to sample selection effects and consequently the choice of the most appropriate control group. Furthermore, many of them do not explicitly consider the mechanisms by which the specialist schools policy could affect the test score outcomes of pupils.
Our contribution in this paper is twofold. This is the first paper that we are aware of to investigate the impact of the specialist school policy on test score outcomes using matching methods. 3 There are several advantages of using simple 'cross-sectional' matching methods, when compared to fixed effects estimation, for instance. Matching methods allow us to deal explicitly with the selection bias issue without the need for variables to identify selection into a specialist school. Selection bias can occur due to the non-random assignment of schools into the specialist schools initiative. Not allowing for this bias would lead to an upward bias on the estimated effect of the specialist schools policy on test score outcomes. 4 A further source of bias is created by unobservable differences between pupils, so-called 'hidden bias'. Thus, conditional on observable characteristics, the selection into specialist schools should be unrelated to unobservable variables, for instance aptitude to study, that may affect test score outcomes. A positive correlation would again lead to an upward bias in the estimate on the specialist schools policy. By using several large and rich datasets we can change the control group in interesting ways to obtain more precise estimates of the specialist schools policy. We also assess the robustness of the conditional independence assumption using some sensitivity analysis tests. Finally, by exploiting panel data on pupils, and combining matching methods with a difference-in-differences approach we can reduce any bias arising from unobserved pupil and school level fixed effects. The second contribution of this paper is that we provide an exploratory analysis of the relative importance of three different mechanisms by which the policy could affect test scores -funding, specialisation and peer effects.
The increase in resources to specialist schools creates a funding effect whereby increased spending on books and equipment, for instance, improves the quality of the educational experience throughout the school and hence improves average test scores in all subjects. Also, by allowing greater subject specialisation, parents can select those schools that 'match' the aptitudes and skills of their children, thereby increasing allocative efficiency. 'Better' subject specialist teachers may also move to schools that specialise in their subject area. Hence test scores in particular subjects may increase -a specialisation effect. Finally, once a school has established a reputation for excellence in a particular subject, there may be a reinforcing peer effect as, for instance, the mathematically gifted become concentrated in schools specialising in mathematics, so raising the performance of other pupils. 3 Previous studies using matching methods are mainly focused on the estimated effects of training programmes on the unemployed. For example, Blundell et al. (2004) study the effects of the New Deal for Young People in the UK. Aakvik (2001) evaluates the Norwegian vocational rehabilitation programme by comparing employment outcomes of participants and nonparticipants. Diprete and Gangl (2004) analyze the impact of unemployment insurance on several outcomes such as post unemployment wage or probability of relocation. Machin et al. (2004) adopt a similar approach to ours in evaluating the Excellence in Cities programme. 4 In fact, as we demonstrate, the schools that were included in the initiative earlier were 'better' schools. Insofar as specialist schools 'cream skimmed' the best pupils, the bias arising from the non-random assignment of schools into the initiative should move in the same direction as the bias at the pupil level. We do not model the selection of schools into the specialist schools initiative directly, however, covariates are included in the propensity score models that affect this selection process.
The data used to estimate the matching models were obtained from several sources: the National Pupil Database (NPD), the Youth Cohort Surveys (YCS) and the Longitudinal Survey of Young People in England (LSYPE), and to each of these datasets we append school level data from the annual School Performance Tables and the annual Schools' Census. We say more about these datasets below.
Our main findings are that the effect of the specialist schools policy on test scores is positive and statistically significant, but approximately 50% lower than the 'naive' estimator that does not allow for matching. Nevertheless, we show that the specialist schools policy increases average test scores by around 2-3 GCSE points. The policy has also had the effect of increasing the probability of obtaining 5+ and 10+ GCSE grades A*-C by about 6 and 7 percentage points, respectively. When taken together and compared with pupils with less than 5+ GCSE grades A*-C, these results imply that the policy has had larger effects for more able students. Moreover, the difference-in-differences model suggests that the policy led to an improvement in test scores between the ages of 14 and 16 of around 0.07 of a standard deviation.
The duration of specialisation also matters, in that the peak of the policy effect is reached after four years, at which point the additional funding typically ceases. However, the policy effect does not decline to zero beyond that point, rather it remains positive and statistically significant. This suggests that we are not simply capturing a simple funding effect. Models that disentangle the funding effect from a specialisation effect suggest that there is a specialisation effect. This amounts to between 21-50% of the total effect depending on the matching estimator used. No direct evidence of a peer effect is found in this analysis, however one cannot rule this out. This is because the effect of the specialist schools policy lasts beyond the 4 year period, which may imply the presence of a peer effect.
These findings are robust insofar as they pass several tests. We observe a substantial reduction in the bias due to selection on observables, and our estimates are robust to a test for unconfoundedness. We also show that our policy effect is not sensitive to unobservables for reasonable values of hidden bias. All of which suggests that the specialist schools policy has had a causal effect on the test score outcomes of secondary school pupils in the UK.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2.1 we discuss the data and the econometric approach, including a discussion of how we select the treatment and comparison groups. Section 4 discusses our findings from what we loosely, refer to as 'crosssectional' matching models and from the difference-in-differences matching models. Section 5 draws some conclusions.
Econometric Approach

Matching methods
Our approach is based on the concept of the education production function wherein test scores are a function of personal, family and school inputs, as well as specialist school status. However, to estimate the effect of the specialist schools policy on the test scores of pupils requires a solution to the counterfactual question of how pupils would have performed had they not attended a specialist school. We adopt the non-parametric matching method which does not require an exclusion restriction, or a particular specification of the model for attendance at a specialist school. Thus, the main purpose of matching is to find a group of non-treated pupils who are similar to the treated in all relevant pre-treatment characteristics, x, the only remaining difference being that one group attended a specialist school and another group did not.
In the first stage we estimate the propensity score (PS) using a discrete response model of attendance at a specialist school. This approach solves the so-called 'dimensionality problem', insofar as we can match the treated with the control group on the basis of a mono-dimensional variable instead of the multi-dimensional vector, x.
One assumption of the matching method is the common support or overlap condition. Intuitively, to estimate the counterfactual for a given pupil we need to have someone similar to that pupil in the counterfactual state. If we do not, we have a failure of the common support condition because the density in one sample is zero whereas there is positive density in the other. This condition ensures that pupils with the same x values have a positive probability of having attended a specialist school. The choice of the covariates to be included in this first stage is an issue. Heckman et al. (1997) show that omitting important variables can increase the bias in the resulting estimation. But, in general, only variables that simultaneously influence the decision to attend a specialist school and the test score outcome, which in turn are unaffected by attendance, should be included in the model. Bryson et al. (2002) also recommend against over-parameterized models because including extraneous variables in the attendance model will reduce the likelihood of finding a common support. Others, such as Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), Dehejia and Wahba (2002) and DiPrete and Gangl (2004) emphasize that the crucial issue is to ensure that the balancing condition is satisfied, because it reduces the influence of confounding variables. Thus, we match the potentially confounding covariates of the pupils assigned to specialist schools with pupils that attended non-specialist schools. Practically, the sample is stratified in several blocks and we carry out a series of two-sample t-tests of the equality of the means on the propensity scores and equality of the means on all covariates, between treated and untreated pupils.
We include in our selection model only those variables that satisfy both the balancing property and the common support condition. Our approach is to create reliable comparison groups and reduce the bias on observables, which makes the matching estimator more efficient.
A second, and key, assumption in the matching method is the conditional independence assumption, which implies that selection into treatment is solely based on observable characteristics. 5 As suggested above, there may be a problem of hidden bias due to unobserved effects. Several tests have been developed to assess whether hidden bias is a problem in cross-sectional models, which we discuss below.
Given these two assumptions, the matching method allows us to estimate the average treatment effect of the treated (ATT). The ATT estimator is the mean difference in outcomes over the common support, weighted by the propensity score distribution of participants.
All matching estimators are weighted estimators, derived from the following general for-mula:
where T and C represent treatment and control groups, respectively. W ij is the weight placed on the jth observation in constructing the counterfactual for the ith treated observation, Y is the outcome and w i is the re-weighting that reconstructs the outcome distribution for the treated sample. A number of well-known matching estimators exist but they differ in how they construct the weights, W ij . In this paper we present the estimates from two matching algorithms. The first is the nearest neighbor matching (NN) estimator. Here a pupil from the control group is chosen as a matched partner for a treated pupil who is closest in terms of the propensity score. In Equation 1 a unity weight is placed on the nearest observation; zero for all other observations, w ij ∈ [1, 0] . A limitation of all NN estimators is that only a few observations from the control group are used to construct the counterfactual for each treated pupil. We therefore also use kernel matching, where every treated pupil is matched with a weighted average of all control pupils with weights that are inversely proportional to the distance between treated and control pupils. Thus, the variance is lower because more information is used, but a drawback is the possible use of observations which are 'poor' matches. The choice of the kernel function is relatively unimportant (see DiNardo and Tobias, 2001) , and in our analysis we use the Epanechnikov function. Caliendo (2005) argues that the choice of 'bandwidth' is more important -high values of the bandwidth yield a smoother estimated density function, with a better fit between the estimated and true underlying density function. However, this can smooth away underlying features and bias the estimates, therefore we use an intermediate value where the bandwidth is 0.1. 6 In general, Smith (2000) argues that, asymptotically, all matching estimators should give the same results because for increasing sample size they all get closer to comparing only exact matches.
Finally, there is an issue in the literature as to whether standard errors should be bootstrapped. Abadie and Imbens (2008) show that bootstrapping is not a valid method to make inference when employing the nearest neighbour matching estimator with a fixed number of matches. We therefore provide analytical standard errors for estimates from the nearest neighbour method. However, with kernel-based matching methods, like those used by Heckman et al. (1998) , the number of matches increases with the sample size and these estimators are asymptotically linear. The standard bootstrap in this case provides valid inference, and so for these models we report bootstrapped standard errors.
Where panel data are available an alternative method can be adopted, that is, the difference-in-differences (DID) matching estimator (Blundell et al., 2004 , Smith and Todd, 2005 and Machin et al., 2004 . This approach requires longitudinal data and relaxes the strong assumption of the cross-sectional matching approaches of selection based solely on observables. The DID matching estimator allows the controls to evolve from a pre-to a postattendance period in the same way treatments would have done had they not been treated (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2002) . DID can be seen as an extension of simple matching, because the bias is not required to vanish for any covariates but just to be the same before and after treatment (Heckman et al., 1998) . Thus the DID matching estimator has the advantage of eliminating unobserved time-invariant differences between treated and untreated observations.
The DID matching estimator for the ATT can be obtained by rewriting Equation 1 as
Assessing the CIA
The conditional independence assumption (CIA), or unconfoundedness, assumes that pupils in the treatment group and comparison group differ only with respect to observed variables. However, there may be a difference due to unobserved variables, and any positive association between a pupil's treatment status and test score outcomes may not therefore represent a causal effect. As noted by Heckman (1998), matching only eliminates bias averaged over specific intervals of the propensity score. If the assumption of ignorability (i.e. no hidden bias) fails, the treatment is endogenous and the matching estimates will be biased. The CIA is not directly testable, because the data are uninformative about the distribution of Y i (0) for the treated and of Y i (1) for the control group. We therefore use two indirect tests from the literature. The first was developed by Imbens (2004) who suggested that there are indirect ways of assessing the CIA, based on the estimation of a 'pseudo' confounding factor that should, if the CIA holds, have zero effect. The second test was proposed by Rosenbaum (1987) and involves computing one 'sensitivity' parameter, representing the association between treatment and a confounding factor, and derives bounds for significance levels and confidence intervals.
For the first test we adopt the method proposed by Ichino et al. (2008) . The first test is based on the prediction of a confounding factor, A, by simulating its distribution for each treated and control unit. Then, estimates of the ATT are derived by including the confounding factor in the set of matching variables. Different assumptions on the distribution of A imply different possible scenarios of deviation from the CIA. For simplicity, let A be a binary variable, its distribution is given by fixing the following parameters
Where Y is a binary test score outcome ('high scores'= 1 and 'low scores'= 0) and T is the pupil's treatment status. In this way, we can define the probability of A = 1 in each of the four groups identified by the treatment and the outcome. 7 In our analysis, we consider the following parameters: p 11 = 0.65, p 10 = 0.55, p 01 = 0.45, p 00 = 0.35. Thus, we assume that the potential confounder variable has both a positive effect on the test scores of pupils in non-specialist schools (p 01 − p 00 > 0), and on selection into specialist schools (p 1. = 0.62 − p 0. = 0.40 > 0). For example, if we interpret A as unobserved pupil ability, p 11 = 0.65 indicates the proportion of high test score pupils among those in specialist schools who get high test scores.
The variable A is included in the set of variables used to estimate the propensity score and the ATT is estimated using the nearest neighbour algorithm. 8 The ATT is re-estimated 1000 times, and the value presented in our Tables is an average over the distribution of A. The test also provides the estimation of two further effects. One effect is the 'outcome effect', which measures the effect of unobserved ability on the test scores of pupils in non-specialist schools, controlling for observables X. 9 This effect in our estimates is always positive (around 1.541 > 1). The second is the 'selection effect', which measures the effect of unobserved ability on attendance at specialist schools, controlling for observables X. 10 This effect in our estimates is positive and much higher than the previous one (2.390 > 1).
The second method proposed by Rosenbaum (1987) involves only one parameter, representing the association of T and A, and derives bounds for significance levels and confidence intervals. Specifically, it computes the upper and lower bounds on the Mantel and Haenszel (MH, 1959) test-statistic used to test the null hypothesis of no treatment effect. In particular, e γ measures the degree of departure from a situation that is free of hidden bias (e γ = 1) and we use e γ in the range [1, 2] ; γ represents the effect of an unobserved variable on the probability of attendance of a specialist school. 11 The test can be interpreted as the difference in the relative odds of attending a specialist school for two pupils that appear similar in terms of observable covariates, x. If those most likely to go to specialist schools are more able, then there is positive unobserved selection and the estimated treatment effects overestimate the true treatment effect. In general, DiPrete and Gangl (2004) stress that the results of this test are worst-case scenarios, insofar as they only reveal how the hidden bias might alter inference.
Data and descriptive statistics 3.1 The data and choice of counterfactual groups
We use three different datasets in our analysis, each of which have different advantages.
The NPD refers to the population of pupils attending maintained, state funded, schools in England who were in their final year of compulsory education in 2003. The primary advantages of the NPD are that it refers to the population of pupils in secondary schooling 8 We omit the results with different methods because they are very similar. 9 Formally, it is the average of the estimated odds ratio of A, from the logit model P (Y = 1|T = 0, A, X) in every iteration. 10 Formally, it is the average of the estimated odds ratio of A, from the logit model P (T = 1|A, X) in every iteration.
11 Thus P r(D i = 1|x i , u i ) = F (βx i + γu i ) is the probability of attending a specialist school and F is the logistic distribution. The odds that pupil i attends a specialist school is given by
and the odds ratio of receiving this treatment is
For simplicity, u is assumed to be a dummy variable and the previous equation may be rewritten as 12 However, to control for common time trends, sorting and the effect of pupil-level unobserved heterogeneity, we estimate a difference-indifferences matching model, using test score information for both Key Stage 3 and 4. Another important advantage of the NPD is that it also includes a measure of pupil attainment prior to entry into secondary schooling, that is, the Key Stage 2 tests taken at age 11.
The YCS is a major programme of longitudinal research designed to monitor the behaviour and decisions of representative samples of young people aged 16 and upwards. The survey records educational outcomes and provides more socio-demographic data on the pupil and their family than in the NPD. However, the primary advantage of the YCS is that we can link schools together to investigate how the test scores of different cohorts of pupils change as a school moves from non-specialist to specialist status. This allows us to construct a 'policy-off' versus 'policy-on' test of the effect of the specialist schools policy on test scores.
The LSYPE is a panel study of young people started in 2004, when its sample of young people were aged 13 to 14. The study brings together data from a wide range of sources and reflects the variety of influences on learning and pupil progression. Annual interviews obtain information from the pupil and from parental interviews. The main advantage of the LSYPE is that we can control for the duration of specialist school status, to investigate whether the effect, if any, of the specialist schools policy declines over time. We can track schools that have been specialised for two, four or more than four years. An additional advantage of these data are that we can exploit a rich set of family covariates, such as parental education and employment, and pupil behaviour, for instance, bullying, misbehavior in school and smoking.
Descriptive statistics and selection bias
The variables of interest are whether a pupil attends a specialist school or not and differences in test scores between the two groups, hence it is instructive to see how specialist schools differ, if at all, to non-specialist schools in this respect. Using the school level data from the annual School's Census, we generate a balanced panel of 2645 schools and we compute the percentage of pupils in a school that obtained 5 or more GCSE grades A*-C for the period 1992-2006 according to whether the school had specialist status or not.
13 . Looking at figure 1, there is a clear difference between specialist and non-specialist schools with respect to the test 12 The Key Stage 3 result for each pupil is the total test score for English, Maths and Science, whereas the Key Stage 4 result for each pupil is the average points scored across all subjects in the GCSE examinations taken at the end of compulsory education.
Pupils prepare for the General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) examinations in typically no more than 10 subjects in their final two years of compulsory schooling between the ages of 14 and 16. The GCSE is a norm-based examination taken by almost all pupils, and the grades range from A* to G. Grades A* to C are considered acceptable for entry to university, together with the acquisition of advanced qualifications obtained two years later. Pupils of lower ability may also take General National Vocational Qualifications instead of GCSEs.
13 5+ A*-C grades is an important policy measure and, when combined with suitable grades at A level, permits entry to HE. score outcome. There is an output trend in GCSE test scores and it is clear that specialist schools have out-performed non-specialist schools throughout the period. Moreover, the differential in GCSE test scores appears to be greatest from around 2002 onwards, which coincides with the period over which our analysis is conducted. Figure 2 digs a little deeper into the difference in test score performance between specialist and non-specialist schools. The first panel of Figure 2 disaggregates the average test score performance of Figure 1 into quintiles and plots the proportion of specialist schools in the lowest (quintile 1) and highest (quintile 5) categories. What is immediately clear is that specialist schools are more likely to have test scores in the highest quintile and this is increasingly so over the time period. The difference between the proportion of specialist schools in each of the two quintiles increases from 0.06 in 1996, for instance, to 0.40 in 2005. This is strong evidence of selection of certain types of school into the specialist schools initiative.
Then we consider the distribution of pupils eligible for free school meals, which can be thought as a measure of social background, we disaggregate it into quintiles and plot again the proportion of specialist schools in each group. From panel two of Figure 1 , it is clear that 'poor' pupils (in the 5th quintile) are less likely to attend specialist schools. We repeat the same exercise using the distribution of ethnic minorities, we disaggregate it into quintile and we plot the percentage difference between non-specialist and specialist schools within the first and fifth quintile. Panels three of Figure 2 suggest that in specialist school it is more likely to find a percentage of ethnic minority lower than 20 per cent (1st quintile), while in non-specialist schools it is more likely to find percentage of ethnic minority higher than 80 per cent.
This implies a systematic sorting of pupils into 'good' schools, which we have shown tend to be specialist schools. It is therefore important to control for the types of selection bias described in the introduction when attempting to evaluate the impact of the specialist schools policy on test scores.
We turn now to the data that we use in our econometric analysis. Table 1 and Table 2 show various measures of test score outcome for each dataset. The first is a variable which summarises the overall GCSE distribution, we compute GCSE score (GCSEscore), the number of points achieved in all GCSE subjects where a grade A * =8 and a fail=0.
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The second is a binary variable indicating whether a pupil obtained 5 or more GCSE grades A*-C (GCSEbin). The third measure is also a dummy variable indicating whether a pupil obtained 10 or more GCSE grades A*-C (GCSEbin10 ), which refers to the upper end of the ability distribution. Table 1 also shows how matching restricts the sample in order to increase the similarity between treatment and control cases. For example, in the NPD from an initial sample of approximately half a million pupils we reduce it to 19,177 observations. However, we also want to minimise 'contamination' of the control group by the treatment group, which could occur if there are spillover effects of educational practices from specialist to non-specialist schools in the same education district. Therefore we limit our treatment and control groups to pupils from districts with only specialist schools versus pupils from districts with no specialist schools. Moreover, we also restrict the sample to treatment and control districts that are non-contiguous. 15 Applying this restriction gives a sample size of 4,292 after matching. The number of non-specialist schools is much lower than specialist schools because by 2003 the majority of schools had acquired specialist status. However, note that the difference in the proportions of pupils in the treated and control groups for each outcome are not substantial.
Then we link schools in YCS11 and YCS12 and restrict attention to those pupils in a nonspecialist school in 2001/02 ('policy-off') and compare them with pupils in the same school which acquired specialist status during 2002/04 ('policy-on'). This reduces the sample to 5,244, of which 5,122 result in 'matched' pairs of pupils (Table 2 ). In the LSYPE the raw sample is smaller than the NPD and YCS samples and after matching the resulting sample size is almost 60% of the raw samples. Nevertheless, the GCSE scores for the raw and the matched samples are very similar.
Findings
Estimation of the propensity score models
The variables included in the propensity score models are those factors that affect a pupil's choice of school, and also in some models the schools' decision to apply for specialist status. However, recall that the variables must pass the balancing test and overlap condition. Table 3 contains the coefficients and the marginal effects from the model constructed from the NPD. Note that we include prior attainment, that is, the standardized test score at Key stage 2, taken at age 11. Prior attainment captures the cumulative effect of the history of family, pupil and school inputs that determined test score up to age 11 (Todd and Wolpin, 2002). This variable is highly statistically significant with a marginal effect of 0.08 (s.e.=0.008) and suggests that more able primary school pupils sort into, or are selected by, selective schools. We also include dummies for ethnicity, which has a large positive effect on attendance at a specialist school (the marginal effect is 0.257 and the s.e. is 0.013), and gender, which is statistically insignificant. The finding on the ethnicity variable may reflect the heterogeneity of ethnic groups in the UK, where Indians and Chinese pupils have relatively high test scores when compared to whites, whereas Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups have relatively lower scores. Our measure of the pupil's family background (i.e. eligibility for free school meals) is negative and highly significant (marginal effect=-0.09 with an s.e.=0.036). Table 4 shows the results of estimating the propensity score model using the YCS data. An expanded set of controls for family background are included in this model, such as parental occupation and whether the pupil is from a single parent background. A very important variable to include is the school performance lagged five years, which is likely to be an important influence on school choice for pupils at age 11. This variable measures the proportion of pupils in the school five years earlier who obtained five or more A*-C grades in the GCSE examinations. Most variables are statistically significant and we note the very strong marginal effect of lagged school performance on school choice.
The analysis in the LSYPE is more complex, since the treatment group refers to pupils in specialist schools disaggregated by the duration that the school has been in receipt of specialist school funding; the control group comprises pupils in non-specialist schools. Specifically, we consider three possible treatments: schools that have been specialist for five or more years, for four years and for two years. Table 5 shows the coefficients and the marginal effects of the three logistic regressions. Many more covariates are included in these models than in the previous models for the NPD and YCS. Many of the covariates work in the expected direction, but only a subset are statistically significant. Pupils who truant and those whose parents are on income support, for instance, are less likely to attend a specialist school. In contrast, those pupils with higher prior attainment or who use a personal computer at home are more likely to attend a specialist school.
In sum, we use three data sets with a different number and type of covariates, and in each case we pass the balancing test and satisfy the common support condition.
'Cross-sectional' estimates
In this Section we investigate the potential impact of the specialist schools policy on test scores assuming no hidden bias, that is, that there is no correlation between treatment status and unobserved variables. However, we do need to assess the effect of estimation in terms of the reduction in bias on observables and the unconfoundedness assumption. We therefore report the results with and without the inclusion of the confounder variable, and assess matching quality by reporting the standardized bias associated with each matching estimator (Caliendo et al, 2005) . 16 In most empirical studies a bias reduction of 3% to 5% is seen as a success of the matching procedure. Recall that our outcomes refer to various test scores of pupils achieved at the age of 15 or 16.
Specialist versus non-specialist pupils in non-contiguous districts
Looking at Table 6 , in Panel A we report for illustrative purposes the estimates for Gcsescore only, using several sample restrictions. With a full sample size, the policy effect on test scores is around 3.4 points, which sharply decreases to 1.7 after matching. This is the case without any control for self-selection in the schools and including all pupils population. When we restrict the sample size, considering different ratios of specialist-non-specialist schools in educational districts (e.g. districts with more than 60% specialist schools vs districts with more than 60% non-specialist schools) we observe a decreasing effect of the policy both prior and after matching. When we finally restrict to districts with only specialist vs districts with no specialist schools, we observe a greater policy effect prior to matching, around 4 points, which after matching drops to 2.5. Finally, Panel B in Table 6 shows the results for non-contiguous districts. Prior to matching, pupils in specialist schools achieve around 7 more points on their GCSE tests than a comparable pupil in a non-specialist school (see 16 This requires that for each covariate we compute the standardised bias (SB) in the unmatched and matched sub-samples as the difference in sample means between treated and control observations, divided by the square root of the average of sample variances in both groups. We then average over the SB of each covariate in the two subsamples in order to obtain the absolute value of the SB before matching and after matching. Note that for the stratification method we only report the number of blocks. Gcsescore). However, the estimates from the matching models suggest that this effect falls to around 2.9 to 3.3 GCSE points, depending on the estimator, and is always statistically significant at the 1% level. The impact of the specialist schools policy is stronger at the upper end of the test score distribution, increasing the probability of a pupil achieving 5 or more GCSE grades A*-C (Gcsebin) by about 8 percentage points and by 6 percentage points at the very high end of the distribution (Gcsebin10 ). However, these effects are between 40-50% lower than the naive estimates. For example, compare the unmatched effect of 0.17 with the ATT of 0.08 for Gcsebin. Also note that only 18% of pupils achieve 10 or more GCSE grades A*-C. Nevertheless, our findings from this analysis suggest that the specialist schools policy has quite a substantial effect at the middle to upper end of the attainment distribution.
The bias drops by between 77-90%, and our estimates are also largely unaffected by the inclusion of a confounding variable, suggesting that the unconfoundedness assumption holds. In Table 11 in the appendix we report the results of the Rosembaum test, and our estimates are robust for all outcomes up to a degree of departure from the situation of no bias to one equal to 1.75. This means that allowing for a (unobserved) confounding factor which makes pupils with the same x differ in their odds of attending a specialist school by 75%, we are still confident that we are not overestimating the true treatment effect. Table 7 , shows that, prior to matching, pupils in a given school during a 'policy-on' period obtain around 2.8 GCSE points more than their counterparts in the same school in the 'policy-off' period. After matching we observe a reduction in the effect on GCSE points score by between 15-37%, with the estimated impact falling to between 1.7-2.0 points. These estimates are broadly in line with those from the estimates obtained for the NPD.
A 'policy-on' versus 'policy-off ' analysis
Interestingly, there is no statistically significant difference in the proportion of pupils obtaining 5 or more GCSEs graded A*-C (Gcsebin), which is clearly inconsistent with the results obtained above, and may be due to the lower sample size. However, at the very top of the attainment distribution (Gcsebin10 ) a positive and statistically significant effect is observed. In fact, the pre-match estimate of 0.9 only falls by between 1 and 2 percentage points depending on the matching estimator. Moreover, these estimates are also very similar to those obtained for the NPD.
The inclusion of a confounder variable has little effect on this pattern of results, and this is confirmed by the Rosembaum test in Table 11 , that is, in the cases up to 50% hidden bias.
The effect of the duration of specialist school status
Insofar as specialist schools receive extra funding per pupil for 4 years after they have become specialist, and given that subject-specific 'reputation' effects take time to develop, then one would expect the positive effect on test scores that we observe to be larger the longer the school has had specialist status. Table 8 shows that this is, in fact, what we observe.
Compare the results for schools that have been specialist for 4 and more than 4 years with those that have been specialist for only 2 years.
Prior to matching, pupils in schools that have been specialist for longest obtain 4.1 GCSE points more than their counterparts in non-specialist schools. The equivalent figure for schools that have been specialist for only 2 years is only 2.7 GCSE points. After matching, these effects fall to 1.8 and 0.5 GCSE points, respectively, and the latter are statistically insignificant. The duration of specialist status clearly matters, however, it is also worth comparing the estimates for schools that have been specialist for 4 years with those that have been specialist for 5 or more years. Recall, that funding lasts for up to 4 years. What we observe is both pre-and post-matching the estimates for the schools that been specialist for 4 years are larger by almost 1 GCSE point, implying that once the funding begins to dry up, the effect on test scores begins to wane. Importantly, however, it does not fall to zero. In sum, this analysis suggests that the longer the time a school has been specialist, the better the test scores of the pupils, however, this effect falls as funding declines. It is also worth noting in passing that the estimated effects for schools that have been specialist for 4 and more than 4 years are consistent with those from the previous analysis.
The bias is substantially reduced, the estimates are robust to the inclusion of a confounding variable and the Rosembaum's test in Table 11 shows that our estimates are not sensitive to hidden bias up to a level of 25%.
The relative importance of the funding, specialisation and peer effects
So far we have considered the total impact of the specialist schools policy by simply looking at the test score outcomes in all subjects for pupils in specialist schools compared to various control groups. In this Section we construct several further tests to try to disentangle the funding, peer and specialisation effects of the specialist schools policy.
Our first test is to focus on test score differences solely for the subjects in which the schools specialised using the NPD. We use two samples of pupils. Firstly, the sample of pupils which limits our treatment and control groups to be not only in different types of school but also from different, non-contiguous, educational districts. Second, a larger sample which removes the need for the specialist and non-specialist schools to be in non-contiguous educational districts. In both cases, we also restrict our analysis to schools that had become specialist in one of the following subject areas -Languages, with and without English, and Technology, which comprise the majority of pupils. To disentangle the specialisation effect from the funding effect we compare the estimates from Panel A with those from Panel B in Table 9 . Panel A compares the test score outcome in say, Languages, of pupils in a specialist school which specialises in that particular subject (the treatment group) with the test score outcome of pupils in Languages in specialist schools that do not specialise in that subject (the control group). Since both schools are specialist they receive the same funding and so the funding effect is constant. In contrast, Panel B compares our treatment group with a different control group -pupil's test score in Languages in non-specialist schools. Since the latter do not receive extra funding, any difference in test score outcomes in Panel B must arise from both the funding and specialisation effects. The difference in the estimates from Panel A and Panel B gives the specialisation effect. Table 9 , Panels A and B show that after matching Gcsescore falls substantially. However, what is of most interest is the fact that the estimates from Panel B are higher than those for Panel A and the magnitude of this difference depends on the matching estimator. For instance, compare the nearest neighbour estimates for Technology for the unrestricted sample of 0.23 (Panel B) and 0.18 (Panel A) with the equivalent for the kernel matching method, that is, 0.32 and 0.16, respectively. The difference between the estimates in Panels A and B for the nearest neighbour method is roughly 0.05 for all subjects, which implies that the specialisation effect constitutes around 22% of the total effect of the specialist schools policy. For the kernel method the implied percentage contribution of the specialisation effect varies from 38% for English to 50% for Technology for the unrestricted sample. Thus, although the actual magnitude of the impact of the specialist schools policy on test scores in the subjects analysed is modest, when compared to the findings in earlier sections, the contribution of the specialisation effect is quite large when measured in percentage terms.
Our second test is designed to disentangle the peer effect from the funding and specialisation effects. To do this we exploit the fact that we observe the duration of specialist status in the LSYPE data. We compare the test score outcome (Gcsescore) for pupils that have been in a specialist school for 4 years (the treatment group) with pupils in schools that have been specialist for only 2 years (the control group). The assumption is that it takes time for a school to build a reputation in a particular subject area and hence attract pupils gifted in that subject. In the (treatment group) propensity score model we include a peer variable, that is, the average performance of pupils in their GCSEs in a school excluding the pupil herself. By comparing the (ATT) estimates of this model with the (control group) model without a peer effect in the propensity score equation enables us to ascertain whether the peer effect is important. Our unreported estimates suggest that this is not the case since the ATT estimates in from both models are very similar in magnitude. Nevertheless, the fact that the selective school policy lasts beyond the 4 year funding period implies that a peer effect may still exist.
The selective schools policy and test score gain
To assess the effect of the selective schools policy on test score gain we implement the difference-differences estimator using a short panel obtained for the NPD. The time varying dependent variables are the standardized test score at age 14 in 2001 (Key Stage 3) and at age 16 in 2003 (Key Stage 4). We use pre-treatment data to perform the matching, because using post-treatment data could in principle affect our ability to identify the correct counterfactual since the matching variables may themselves be affected by the attendance status of the pupil. In order to generate a reliable comparison group we use the same observable covariates as before, but also add a variable to capture whether the pupil changed school between KS3 and KS4. We include only those variables that pass the balancing test. Once we have the matching weights in the pre-treatment status, we use them to compute the difference between treated and controls before and after treatment. We keep the weights unchanged and impose the condition that the overlapping support is the same in the two periods.
In Table 10 we present our results based on three matching methods; the standard errors are analytical for nearest neighbour and bootstrapped for Kernel and stratification. When we smooth the counterfactual outcomes with a kernel based method or when we use a stratification method, the estimates are of similar magnitude, positive and statistically significant. However, the results based on the nearest neighbour weighting scheme turn out to be much less precise.
Looking at the unmatched estimates there is a small increase in test scores between age 14 and 16 of around 0.07 standard deviation points. After matching, the estimates fall by around 13-26% and remain statistically significant. We can conclude that the effect of specialist schools in terms of improvement in test scores from KS3 to KS4, for the same pupil, is less than 0.07 standard deviation points relative to a pupil that attended a non-specialist school at KS4.
Conclusions
In this paper we evaluate whether there is a causal association between the specialist schools policy, which can be regarded as a structural change in UK education policy beginning in 1994, and the test score outcomes of secondary school pupils in England. Our approach has been to use matching methods, which have become popular in the context of programme evaluation, especially with respect to the effectiveness of training schemes and programmes for the unemployed. To our knowledge there has been no previous attempt to apply such methods to an evaluation of the specialist schools policy. By adopting this approach we can explicitly confront the twin problems of the choice of suitable control groups, to answer the counterfactual question of what would have happened in the absence of treatment, and the potential bias arising from a correlation between the treatment status and observed and unobserved covariates. We use several datasets in our analysis, the NPD, several versions of the YCS and the LSYPE, which allow us to construct different control groups and hence test the robustness of our estimates. Three cross-sectional measures of test score outcome, relating to particular points on the test score distribution (Gcsebin and Gcsebin10 ) or a summary of the entire distribution (Gcsescore), are analysed. In addition, we use difference-in-differences combined with matching methods to investigate the effect of the specialist schools policy on the change in test scores between the ages of 14 and 16.
Our main findings are as follows. First, there is a positive and statistically significant impact of the specialist schools policy on test score outcomes, which is approximately 50% lower than our 'naive' estimates that do not allow for matching. Nevertheless, all three cross-sectional models suggest that the specialist school policy has increased the GCSE points score by approximately 2-3 GCSE points. The specialist schools policy has, however, had a more substantial effect at the upper (Gcsebin) and high end (Gcsebin10 ) of the test score distribution. Our estimates suggest an improvement of between 6 and 7 percentage points for Gcsebin and Gcsebin10, respectively. These results imply that the policy has had a more beneficial effect on more able students.
Second, the longer a school has been a specialist school the larger the impact on test scores, however, there is some evidence that the impact begins to fall after 4 years once the additional funding associated with the policy begins to decline. Importantly, however, the policy effect does not fall to zero.
Third, the impact of the specialist schools policy on test scores could arise from a funding effect, a specialisation effect or a peer effect. We attempt to disentangle these effects. Our findings for Gcsescore suggest that between 21-50% of the total effect in particular subjects arises from the specialisation effect. This finding is consistent with our evidence on the duration of the specialist school policy effect.
Fourth, in our investigation of the impact of the specialist school policy particular attention is given to the problems of selection bias based on unobservable variables. Our findings are robust to a series of sensitivity tests and hence we can be confident that a causal association between the specialist schools policy and test score outcomes is being observed.
Finally, we estimated a difference-in-differences matching model to control for timeinvariant unobserved differences between treated and untreated pupils. The specialist schools policy improves test scores between the ages 14 and 16 by about 0.07 of a standard deviation.
To summarise, we have demonstrated a statistically significant causal effect of the specialist schools policy on test score outcomes and test score gain. But the estimated effect is small. Note: T = 0 untreated pupils in non-specialist schools T = 1 treated pupils in specialist schools. Significance levels * : 10% * * : 5% * * * : 1% indicates treatment effect is not sensitive to selection bias. Note: bounds computed with the methods NN for NPD, Kernel for YCS and LSYPE
